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ABSTRACT
The protective relay schemes for the new Rochester Gas and Elec
tric 's 345 kV tie at Pannell Road are described. The line protection
consists of two sets of permissive
.overreaching,
direct underreaching,
transferred trip schemes; one being electromechanical and one being
solid state.
A brief description of the basic relay schemes, a list of relays
and an elementary diagram is included.
PREFACE
As the System Protection Engineer for the Rochester Gas and Elec
tric Corporation it was my responsibility to design the protection
schemes to be used at Pannell Road. Due to the magnitude of the job,
the primary intent of "Relaying Pannell Road 345 kV" is to supply a con
cise relay elementary diagram and list of material to the consulting
engineer, reflecting the relay philosophies of t*ie Rochester Gas and
Electric. The nucleus of the paper is the elementary diagram. An
elementary diagram is very similiar to a flow diagram and is considered
throughout the power industry as the basis for substation control board
design.
The protection scheme design of Pannell Road was subject to heavy
constraints. In order to maintain transient stability and permit instan
taneous reclosing on the 345 kV lines, some sort of piloted relay system
was required. Due to the excessive length of the lines, hard wire 60 Hz
pilot wire relays were eliminated. Because of heavy mutual coupling of
the parallel PASNY lines directional comparison relays were eliminated.
This left either a phase comparison scheme or distance relays within a
permissive overreaching scheme. Considering the equipment already in
vested in the far end terminals, distance relays within a permissive
overreaching scheme was the logical choice.
The Paper also contains a section on the theory of distance relays,
bus protection, and transformer protection which is to be used as an out
line in the training of Rochester Gas and Electric operating personnel.
The author gratefully acknowledges suggestions given by those who
reviewed the manuscript. Special thanks is due: Professor D. C Robin
son of the Rochester Institute of Technology, L. L. Harris and E. S.
VanHorn of the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. Thanks also to
Bonnie Warner for typing the final draft.
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INTRODUCTION
Rochester Gas and Electric is an investor owned utility serving
approximately 820,000 people over 2300 square miles, including most of
Monroe County and portions of eight other counties extending through
the Genesee Valley to the Pennsylvania border.
Rochester Gas and Electric' s system peak load is approximately 800
MW. Generation includes 502.5 MW of fossil fuelplants, 53.1 MW of
hydro power, and 420 MW of nuclear power. In addition to its own gener
ation, Rochester Gas and Electric is a member of the New York Power Pool
and may purchase power from neighboring utilities such as Niagara
Mohawk, New York State Gas and Electric and the Power Authority of the
State of New York (PASNY) .
Rochester Gas and Electric has one nuclear unit, Robert E. Ginna
Station or Brookwood as it was called before its dedication. The plant
is a 420 MW generator and low pressure reactor in the town of Ontario,
N.Y. Before Ginna Station was put in operation in 1969, approximately
200 MW was bought from PASNY through RG&E's 345 kV tie at Station 80 in
Henrietta, N.Y. With Ginna Station in service it is not necessary to
buy power; in fact, there is a surplus of approximately 200 MW. During
refueling shutdowns at Ginna however, Station 80 supplies the difference.
Station 80' s firm capability of 200 MW is just adequate at such times
but will not accommodate future growth of the system load. Therefore,
the capability of Station 80 must be increased or a new tie at 345 kV
must be established. RGSE has decided after numerous load flow studies
that it is more economical to build a new 345 kV tie at Pannell Road.
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HISTORICAL REVIEW AND PROPOSED LAYOUT
Rochester Gas and Electric' s Pannell Road Substation (Station 122)
is in the town of Perinton, N.Y. directly adjacent to the 345 kV cross
state ties (Refer to fig. 1 for the following discussion) . The station
is presently a 115 kV straight bus with four breakers and provisions
for a bus tie position.
Station 122 was originally built to provide a 115 kV backup for
Station 204 in Webster, N.Y. (through circuit 912), by splitting Niagara
Mohawk's trunk number 4 from Mortimer Station (Henrietta, N.Y.) to
Border City Station (Geneva, N.Y.). The forth circuit (circuit 914 from
Station 122 to 121) was built as part of the Ginna transmission project.
The purpose of 914 circuit is to provide an alternate outlet for Ginna
power in the event circuit 908 or 912 is lost.
The 345 kV expansion of Pannell Road will be of breaker and a half
design. The breaker and a half design (see fig. 1) requires the open
ing of two breakers per terminal in order to clear a line fault, but has
the advantages over a single breaker straight but in that any breaker
can be removed from service for maintenance without interruption of a
transmission line and that the entire station is not lost for a stuck
breaker or a bus fault.
1. The portion of trunk 4 between Mortimer Station and Station 122 was
renumbered trunk 24. At the same time trunk 25 (25 cycle construction)
from Mortimer to Solvay, N.Y. was rebuilt and dead ended at Fairport.
The portion of trunk 25 east from Station 122 was rebuilt and parallel
ed with trunk 4 as far as tower number 435. From tower 435 east, trunk
25 is not in use.
2. Power will normally flow east on trunks 4 and 13. Trunks 4 and 13
have much lower current carrying capacity than 908 or 912.
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Each bus of the 345 kV station will feed a 200 MVA 345/115 kV
transformer. These transformers will feed into each end of the exist
ing 115 kV bus at Pannell Road. Both transformers will have a 13 kV
delta tertiary or stabilizing winding which will also be used to supply
the house service transformers. At this time, only one of the Clay
lines will be tapped with one 200 MVA transformer.
Each 345 kV breaker will have a continuous rating of 3000 amperes
and be capable of interrupting 40,000 amperes symmetrical, with an inter-
*
rupting time of two cycles on a 60 Hz basis. All six breakers will be
capable of high speed reclosing, ie. reclosing with no intentional time
delay.
Each breaker is to be equipped with six 3000 to 7.5 ampere current
transformers; three in each bushing. Line potential is to be supplied
by two sets of three phase potential devices on each line with the excep
tion of one three phase potential transformer, used for calibration of
the potential devices, which will be located on the Rochester to Pannell
line. Bus potential is to be supplied by a single phase potential
device on each bus. Kilowatt hour metering will be done on the lowside
of the 200 MVA transformers.
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PROTECTIVE RELAYING (Theory)
The function of protective relaying is to supply the intelligence
to cause the removal of any element of a power system during a fault
(short circuit) or any other abnormal condition which could effect sta
bility or reduce the efficiency of the system.
A well designed protective relaying scheme must be both reliable
and secure. That is, the scheme must have the ability to trip positive
ly with a minimum time delay for bonafide fault within its zone of pro
tection and yet it must positively restrain itself when the fault is not
within its zone of protection. It is then obvious that reliability and
security are not compatible. In order to increase reliability, some
security must be sacrificed. The System Protection engineer's job is to
establish a compromise and build a philosophy within the guidelines of
his company, neighboring companies and economics.
Following the blackout on November 9, 1965, the Northeast Power
Coordinating Council (NPCC) was established. The Council's major func
tions were to establish basic guidelines and to formalize the fundamen
tal philosophies concerning protection of bulk transmission equipment.
Rochester Gas and Electric participated in this council and agreed to
3
follow the guidelines established. The relaying at Pannell Road meets
the Northeast Power Coordinating Council criterion as best as can be
determined.
The 345 kV line relaying at Pannell Road will be distance relayed
within a permissive overreaching direct underreaching transferred trip
3. N.P.C.C. guidelines are included in the appendix.
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scheme utilizing audio tones over telephone and microwave channels. In
order to maintain transient stability and permit instantaneous reclosing,
some sort of piloted relaying is required. A piloted relaying system is
simply an extension of the principle of differential relaying protection
applied to line relaying. Other types of pilot systems available are
phase comparison and directional comparison. However, because of the
heavy mutual coupling between the two parallel PASNY lines and the equip
ment already invested in the existing far end terminals, the permissive
overreaching scheme is the logical choice.
In accordance with the Northeast Power Coordinating Council's cri
teria, there are to be two completely separate sets of relays covering
each zone of protection designated primary and secondary. In the case
of the line relaying at Pannell Road, the primary and secondary relaying
is electrically and functionally identical.
The primary set of relays are to be for the most part electromechan
ical. They are to be mounted on the rear of a standard duplex control
board. Direct current control voltage is to be supplied by a standard
129 volt station battery which will also supply direct current power to
any other auxiliary control functions excluding the secondary relays or
the trip coils associated with the secondary relays.
The secondary set of relays are to be for the most part solid state.
They are to be mounted in standard rack assemblies and be as physically
separated from the primary relays as possible. Direct current control
power for these relays is to be supplied by a separate station battery.
The primary 345 kV bus protection consists of differential voltage
relays . The secondary bus protection is provided by overlapping the
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transformer protection to include the bus.
The 345 kV to 118 kV autotransformer protection consists of primary
and secondary sets of percentage differential relays. The secondary
differential relays also provide secondary bus protection on the high-
side. Operation of either the primary or secondary relays will cause a
highside motor operated disconnect to open after the fault has been
cleared by the high and lowside breakers. Operating of this disconnect
will allow a one shot reclosure on the 345 kV bus. It is felt that it
is not worth an additional exclusive set of secondary bus differential
relays in order to avoid loosing the transformer for a transient bus
fault.
Circuit breaker failure protection is achieved through both primary
and secondary relaying in conjunction with fault detectors on each side
of each breaker. This arrangement thus provides stuck breaker protec
tion with either primary or secondary relaying out of service. Stuck
breaker protection on the transformer breakers can also be completed
through an "a" switch and a transformer lockout relay contact. This
combination allows for high impedance faults within a transformer in
which the fault detectors may not have picked up.
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LINE RELAYING
The 345 kV lines will be distance relayed within a permissive over
reaching, direct underreaching, transferred trip scheme utilizing audio
tones over telephone and microwave channels.
There are many types of distance relays; the simplest is the impe
dance relay. In an impedance relay, a torque produced by a voltage ele
ment balances a torque produced by a current element. At the balance
point, for a given ratio of current to voltage; which is the definition
of impedance, the relay is on the verge of operating (see fig. 2).
Neglecting for simplicity any control springs or mechanical aspects of
the relay, a torque equation for the relay actuating device can be writ
ten.
T =
I^I2
-
K2V2
where T is torque, K^_ and K2 are constants and 0 is the power factor
angle .
For T = 0
K-lI2
=
K2V2
and
B = R + jX = V = Kn e]
0 i
EL
K2
-Page 8
Positive Torque
Current
Operating Characteristic
Noc^tlve Torque
Voltaco
Tfcure 2
The operating characteristic of an impedance unit is shown in fig
ure 3.
JX
Segative
Torque
Figure 3
The design basis for most relays, including a simple time over-
current relay is the torque equation. To avoid going into the details
of the physical construction of any relays, let us rely on the torque
equation to explain the operation of a particular relay. With some
-Page 9
knowledge of field theory and a little imagination, it is not hard to
construct in your own mind some semblance of a workable physical model.
A much more practical distance relay, from a applications stand
point, is the admittance or mho type distance relay. Its torque equa
tion, neglecting spring constant again is
T = K-jVI Cos (9 - T) - K2V2
were T is a constant called the angle of maximum torque. Thus for T = 0:
B + V e-1 = K-j^ Cos (0 - T) e 3
The operating characteristic of a mho unit is shown in figure 4.
Operating
Characteristic Negative Torque
Positive Torque
R
Figure It
Another very useful distance relay is the reactance type distance
relay. Its torque equation neglecting spring constant is:
T = K^2 - K2VI sin 0
Thus for T = 0
X = B sin 0 0 =
_Kj
I K^
Page 10
The operating characteristic of a reactance unit is shown in fig
ure 5,
j*
Operating Characteristic
Negative Torque
A
Positive Torque
Figure 5
Note in the reactance type relay, the relay is insensitive to line
resistance. This feature is useful in the protection of short, lower
voltage transmission lines where arc resistance would be an important
consideration. Usually reactance type relays are combined v/ith a mho
type unit. The mho unit not only provides the directional function but
also provides a second or third zone of protection.
At this time it should be pointed out that the R-X diagrams in fig
ures 2 thru 4 in which the relay characteristics are plotted can also be
used to plot the impedance of the protected transmission lines. Such
plots are useful in the application of distance relays. (See figures
6 thru 9.)
Both the primary and secondary distance relays on the Pannell-Clay
line as well as the secondary distance relays on the Pannell-Rochester
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line are two zone mho type relays. (See figures 5, 6, and 7 for the R-X
diagram. ) Zone one in each case covers the first 80% of the line and is
allowed to trip the local line breakers directly with no intentional
time delay, should a fault appear within its reach. At the same time an
audio tone is sent via microwave or telephone to the far terminal to per
mit instantaneous opening of those breakers if the relays at that termi
nal detect a fault within zone two. Zone two at each end covers 120% of
the line. (Note that if a fault is detected in zone one, it is automatic-
ally within zone two.) Again if the local breakers detect a fault
within zone one, the relays can trip the breakers immediately only if a
permissive trip signal is received and the fault is detected for 20 cycles
on a 60 HB basis, tripping will occur through contacts of a timer.
The primary distance relays on the Pannell-Rochester line are to be
reactance type distance relays, that is two reactance and a mho unit
(see figure 8) . Zone one reaches 80% of the line; zone two reaches 120%
and zone three 150%. The permissive overreaching scheme is the same.
The only reason a reactance unit is used here instead of a mho unit is
because no mho unit is available with such a short reach.
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BUS RELAYING
The primary 345 kV bus protection is a current differential scheme
utilizing overvoltage relays. (See Fig. 10) This type of scheme allows
the use of conventional current transformers with low impedance second
aries. The current transformers are connected in the usual current
differential; however, instead of an overcurrent relay, a high impedance
overvoltage relay which requires very little energy to operate provides
the high speed protection. The efficiency of this method is further
increased by placing the relay coil across a full wave rectifier which
makes the relay's coil appear as 90 percent resistive and allows the use
of a direct current overvoltage element.
In order to limit the high voltage within the scheme that would
occur during severe faults, a thyrite and overcurrent relay is placed in
parallel with the voltage element.
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TRANSFORMER PROTECTION
The 345 kV to 118 kV auto transformer protection consists of pri
mary and secondary sets of percentage differential relays. Just as in
the primary bus protection, the transformer protection relys on a cur
rent differential scheme utilizing overvoltage relays. (See Fig. 11)
Current; however, must be adjusted through an auxiliary transformer
within each relay to allow for current transformer#mismatchat the
different transformed voltages. Also not found in the bus protection
relays is a through current element which introduces a restraining volt
age onto the operate coil and prevents the relay contacts from closing
during an external fault condition.
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No. 1 Transformer - Primary and Secondary Relay List
87TP 3 - BDD16B11A three restraint, single phase high speed,
percentage transformer differential relays. Used to detect
and initiate clearing of any fault within the transformer.
Contacts pick up the 94TP tripping relay.
87TS 3 - BDD17B11A relays (four restraint, single phase high speed
percentage transformer differential relays). Used to detect
and initiate clearing of any fault within the transformer or
the 345 kV bus. Contacts pick up the 94TS tripping relay.
94TP 1 - HLA11B17A multicontact auxiliary relay used to trip
high and lowside transformer breakers as well as 86TP lock
out relay.
94TS 1 - HLA11B17A multicontact auxiliary relay used to trip
high and lowside transformer breakers as well as 86TS lock
out relay.
86TP 1 - Electroswitch #7810D hand reset auxiliary relay, with
20 normally open and 20 normally closed contacts. Contacts
are used to trip and block reclosing of the motor operated
highside disconnect.
86TS 1 - Electroswitch #78100 hand reset lockout relay with 20
normally open and 20 normally closed contacts. Contacts are
used to trip and block reclosing of the motor operated high-
side disconnect.
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Pannell - Clay No. 1 Primary Relay List (General Electric)
21P-1 1 - CEY15A3A zone packaged directional mho distance relay
with range from 1 to 10 ohms. Unit provides first zone
phase fault protection.
21P-2 1 - CEY16A3A zone packaged directional mho distance relay
with a range from 3 to 30 ohms. Unit acts as a high speed
overreaching permissive trip unit for phase faults. Con
tacts key tone transmitter and 94C/TTZ coordinating relay.
This unit also provides second zone phase fault protection
thru contacts of RPM timer (62/21P2) .
21GP 1 - CEY16G4A zone packaged directional mho distance relay
with a range from 2 to 20 ohms. Unit acts as a high speed
overreaching permissive trip unit for ground faults . Con
tacts key tone transmitter and 94C/TTZ coordinating relay
thru the directional contact of the 21GPY. This unit also
provides second zone ground fault protection thru contacts
of the RPM timer (62/21P2) .
62/21P-2 1 - RPM14D12A timer to operate in conjunction with the
second zone distance relay 21P-2 to provide second zone time
delay tripping.
50FD/21P 1 - PJC #0127A7618-G1 three element instantaneous overcurrent
relay containing two elements with a range from 4 to 16
amperes for phase fault detection and one element with a
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51G 1 - IAC53A101A very inverse time overcurrent relay with a
pickup range of 4 to 16 amperes. Relay is used to provide
backup for transformer relays and lowside bus relays.
5 ITER 1 - IAC53DIA very inversed time overcurrent relay containing
three elements with a pickup range of 4 to 16 amperes.
Relay used to detect multi-phase faults in the house service
transformer. Contacts pick up 94TS tripping relay.
59TER 1 - IAV51AIA overvoltage relay with a pickup range between
55 to 140 volts. Used to detect single phase faults in the
house service transformer by sensing overvoltage in a broken
delta potential transformer connection. Contacts are used
to alarm only.
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range from 2 to 8 amperes for ground fault detection.
68P 1 - CEB12B4A offset mho distance relay used to block high
speed reclosing during an out of step condition.
21GPY 1 - CFPG16A2A dual polarized directional distance ground
auxiliary relay used in conjunction with 21GP.
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94P 1 - HLA11B17A multicontact auxiliary relay used as a tripping
relay for line faults.
94PX 1 - HLA11B12A multi contact auxiliary relay used to provide
the drop-out circuit for the 94P relay.
94A/RI/TX/GX 1 - NAA27H relay. Used in permissive scheme (Line fault) .
RI - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and time delay dropout
is energized by a permissive tripping operating and is used
to prolong keying of the permissive transmitter.
TX - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and dropout picks up on
receipt of a permissive trip signal to give an alarm during
test of the channel.
GX - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and time delay dropout
picks up upon receipt of a guard signal and drops out upon
loss of guard after 0.4 seconds time delay to give an alarm
and open the permissive trip circuit.
94B/TX/GX 1 - NAA27K relay, used in transfer trip scheme for remote
faults. The TX and GX units provide the same functions as
the TX and GX units in the 94A relay in the transfer trip
scheme.
94C/BX/TTZ 1 - NAA27J relay. Used in permissive trip scheme.
BX - auxiliary unit has a time delay pickup of 6 cycles
and operates from breaker "b" switches to send a continuous
permissive tripping signal when the associated circuit
breakers are open.
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TTZ - Auxiliary unit has a time delay pickup of 1.25 cycles.
It is energized from both the phase and ground permissive
units 21P-2 and 21GP. The contacts are in the permissive
tripping circuit to provide time delay for local breakers to
insure simultaneous tripping with the remote terminals.
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Rochester - Pannell No. 1 Primary Relay List (General Electric)
2IP 3 - GCX51A11A three-zone phase packaged directional reactance
type distance relays with a range from . 1 to 4 ohms; provides
three zone directional distance phase fault protection and is
used in conjunction with RPM timer 62/21P.
62/21P 1 - RPM14D12A timer. Operated in conjunction with 21P to
provide second and third zone time delay tripping.
21GP 3 - GCXG51A12A relays, three-zone phase packaged directional
ground distance relay, range .25 to 10 ohms; provides three
zone directional distance ground fault protection. Used in
conjunction with RPM time 62/21GP.
62/21GP 1 - RPM14D12A timer. Operates in conjunction with 21GP and
21GPY to provide second and third zone tripping for ground
faults.
21GPY 1 - NAA15E7A relay. Non directional overcurrent relay with
auxiliary units to block tripping of 21GP during phase faults.
50FD/21P 1 - PJC #0127A7618-G1 relay, three element instantaneous
overcurrent relay. Two elements with 4 to 16 ampere range
for phase fault detection and one element with a 2 to 8
ampere range for ground fault detection.
68P 1 - CEB12B4A relay, offset mho distance relay. Used to block
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high speed reclosing during an out of step condition.
94P 1 - HLA11B17A multicontact auxiliary relay used as a tripping
relay for line faults.
94PX 1 - HLA11B12A multicontact auxiliary relay used to provide
drop-out circuit for the 94P relay.
94A/RI/TX/GX 1 - NAA27H relay, used in permissive scheme (line fault) .
RI - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and time delay drop
out is energized by a permissive tripping operation and is
used to prolong keying of the permissive transmitter.
TX - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and dropout picks up
on receipt of a permissive trip signal to give an alarm
during test of the channel.
GX - Auxiliary unit with fast pickup and time delay dropout
picks up upon receipt of a guard signal and drops out upon
loss of guard after 0.4 seconds time delay to give an alarm
and open the permissive trip circuit.
94B/TX/GX 1 - NAA27K relay. Used in transfer trip scheme for remote
faults. The TX and TX units provide the same functions as
the TX and GX units in the 94A relay in the transfer trip
scheme.
94C/BX/TTZ 1 - NAA27J relay. Used in permissive trip scheme.
BX - auxiliary unit has a time delay pickup of 6 cycles and
operated from breaker "b" switches to send a continuous
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permissive tripping signal when the associated circuit
breakers are open.
TTZ - auxiliary unit has a time delay pickup of 1.25 cycles -
It is energized from both the phase and ground permissive
units 21P-2 and 21GP- The contacts are in the permissive
tripping circuit to provide time delay to local breakers to
insure simultaneous tripping with the remote terminals.
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Pannell - Clay No. 1 Secondary Relay List (Westinghouse)
21S-1 1 - SKDU-1 zone packaged mho type distance relay with a
range from .2 to 4.35 ohms. Unit provides first zone phase
fault protection. The SKDU-1 has an additional feature which
allows the three phase fault - detecting unit to trip on
current only in the event a closein fault drops the relay
voltage to zero.
21S-2 1 - SKDU-1 same as 21S-1. Unit provides high speed over
reaching permissive trip as well as second zone phase fault
protection. Logic and timing is provided by an auxilliary.
output package (95) .
21GS-1 1 - SDGU-6 zone packaged mho type ground distance relay with
a range from .2 to 4.35 ohms. Unit provides first zone
ground fault protection.
21GS-2 1 - SDGU-7 zone packaged mho type ground distance relay with
a range from .2 to 4.35 ohms. Unit provides high speed
overreaching permissive trip as well as second zone ground
fault protection. Logic and timing is provided by an
auxilliary output package (95) .
85 1 - STU-12 solid state transfer trip relay. Unit. provides;
a. Loss of potential alarm if a distance relay inadvertantly
operates on a blown a.c. potential fuse or a.c. is lost
for more than 500 milli-seconds.
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b. Logic to combine all inputs to key the transmitter through
buffer circuitry.
c. Channel supervision alarms.
d. Auxiliary units with 6 cycle time delay pickup operated
from breaker "b" switches to send a continuous permissive
tripping signal when associated circuit breakers are
opened. (Serves same function as the 94C/BX relay in the
primary relay scheme . )
e. Auxiliary unit with 4 millisecond time delay pickup oper
ated from both phase and ground permissive units to pro
vide time delay to local breakers to insure simultaneous
tripping with remote terminals (serves same function as
the 94C/TTZ in primary relay scheme) .
95 1 - STU satic output relay. Unit provides:
a. Outputs for breaker failure initiation.
b. Outputs to trip local breakers for first zone distance
relay trips.
c. Outputs to trip local breakers for permissive trip in
second zone.
d. Time delay for second zone distance relay trips.
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Stuck Breaker Schemes
50BB 6 - CHC11A2A three element instantaneous overcurrent relays;
two elements with range from 2 to 8 amperes for phase fault
detection and one element with a range from 1 to 4 amperes for
ground fault detection.
94BU 3 - HGA14A52F Auxiliary tripping relays to provide breaker
tripping contacts through the 79x and 27L contacts. This
allows for highspeed tripping of close in faults following an
automatic reclosure. (Directional units and mho type distance
relay elements require voltage to develope a pickup torque.
On close in faults, this voltage is provided by a "memory
action" inherient in the relay; however, prior to an auto
matic reclosure the relay has no voltage applied to it if the
potential transformer is on the line side to the breaker.)
62BB 3 - NAM11C1A timing relays with a range from .03 to .2 seconds
to initiate the stuck breaker scheme in the event either line
breaker fails to clear a fault after a predetermined number of
cycles.
86BB 3 - Electroswitch No. 7810D hand reset lockout relays with 20
normally open contacts and 20 normally closed contacts. Con
tacts are used to trip and block reclosing of backup breakers.
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Primary Bus Differential Relay List
87B/345 3 - PVD11C13A bus differential relays with a current range
from 4 to 100 amperes and a voltage range from 100 to 400
volts. Unit is used to detect and initiate clearing of bus
faults. Contacts pick up 94B/345.
94B/345 1 - HLA11B17A multicontact auxiliary relay used to trip bus
breakers for bus faults.
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Appendix I
Bulk Power System
Protection Philosophy-
Prepared By-
Northeast Power Coordinating Council
Task Force on System Protection
Adopted by the members of
the Northeast Power Coordinating
Council, August 31, 1970
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Bulk Power System
Protection Philosophy
1.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this Protection Philosophy is to establish the relay
protection objectives on the NPCC bulk power system. The bulk power
system is defined as the interconnected three phase, alternating
current electrical systems of NPCC members comprising generation and
transmission facilities on which faults or disturbances can have a
significant effect outside of the local area. These objectives shall
apply to all relay protection systems specified for installation
after the date of adoption of the philosophy.
Special conditions and considerations on some segments of the system
may require the use of more demanding objectives.
It is recognized that there are existing portions of the system which
do not meet the objectives as outlined herein. It will be the
responsibility of individual members to assess the protection systems
at these locations and make modifications which in their judgment are
required to meet the general intent of this philosophy as outlined in
Section 2.0.
2.0 GENERAL PROTECTIVE PHILOSOPHY
2.1 Protection Objectives
The design objectives of relay protection systems on the
bulk power system are:
2.11 To minimize the effects of system disturbances.
2.12 To minimize possible damage to system equipment.
2.13 To insure to the maximum practical extent that
no single contingency will totally disable the
protection on any bulk power system element.
In general, this requires that protective relay systems have
the ability to recognize and isolate all system faults rapidly
and with a high degree of dependability and security. Reliable
operation of protective relay systems on the bulk power system
must be assured because a malfunction can. have far-reaching
effects, such as extensive service
interruptions and/or damage
to vital equipment. At minimum, this means that relay systems
must satisfy the "NPCC Basic Criteria for Design and Operation
of Interconnected Power Systems". However, consideration
should be given to providing relay system designs which will
permit the power system to meet more severe requirements than
are contained in the above-mentioned criteria.
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2.2 Dependability
Dependability is one of the two most important factors which
must be considered in the design of relay protective systems.
A dependable relay system design must include careful
attention to the following:
2.21 To insure maximum dependability, all elements of
the bulk power system must be protected by at least
two protective systems, each of which is independently
capable of detecting and isolating all faults without
undue disturbance to the Bulk Power System consistent
with basic NPCC criteria. Common components are to
be avoided and areas of common exposure should be kept
to a minimum, to reduce the possibility of any circum
stance that may lead to the simultaneous failure of
both systems. It is desirable to avoid* the use of
two identical systems in order to minimize the risk
of simultaneous failure of both systems due to an
obscure design or material weakness.
2.22 Relaying systems should be no more complex than is
required for any given application.
2.23 The components used in protective relay systems
should be of proven quality as demonstrated either
by practical operational experience or by stringent
tests under simulated operating conditions to insure
that the dependability of the protective relay
systems is not adversely affected by some device
of unknown quality or capability.
Components should have both the ability to withstand
the most severe short-time overloads to which they
may be subjected, and a continuous thermal capability
such that they will not impose restrictions on the
operation of the power system.
The protective relay systems should be designed to
minimize the possibility of component failure or
relay malfunction due to transient conditions.
2.2^ Monitoring of the protective system is required to
provide information regarding its operating condition.
2.25 Breaker failure protection must be provided to trip
all necessary local and remote breakers in the event
that a breaker fails to clear a fault.
2.26 The relay system should be designed to minimize damage
to relays and associated equipment in the event of a
malfunction or failure of a component part.
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2.3 Security.
Ranking in importance with dependability is the ability
of a protective system to be secure against undesired
operations. In a highly complex bulk power system, an
undesired breaker operation, occurring especially during
a condition of system fault or other disturbance, may
produce or initiate events of far-reaching consequences.
2.31 One of the primary requisites of a protective
system is to isolate only the section necessary
to remove any type of fault from the system.
For faults outside of its intended zone of
operation, every relay system must be designed
to either not operate or operate selectively
with other systems .
2.32 Protective systems should also be secure
against any abnormal or unusual operational
condition. They must be so designed that they
will not operate for any system swing of less
severity than that which would cause instability.
Except in rare cases, protective relay settings
should not be the load-limiting factor. In such
cases, the load limits imposed by the relay
setting must be well documented and become a
system operating constraint.
2.33 The design should minimize the possibility of
undesired operations caused by component failures
or environmental conditions, such as vibration,
shock, temperature, etc.
2.3^ Circuitry and techniques should be employed
which minimize the possibility of undesired
operations due to personnel error.
2.h Operating Time
Requirements of the bulk power system for high-speed clearing
are particularly stringent. Normal practice should provide
for clearing all faults in the shortest possible time with due
regard to selectivity, dependability and security. In those
cases where there is consideration of a possible increase of
clearing time to gain other advantages, careful analysis must
be given to the following:
2. Ill System stability and any decrease in stability
margins which might result from longer clearing
times.
2.142 Possible damage to equipment and the effect of
time on the extent of damage which might be expected
if faults are allowed to persist for a longer time
than minimum.
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2.1*3 Possible hazard to personnel.
2.kh Effect of disturbances on service to customers
in- the area and the consequences which may result
from voltage fluctuations during such disturbances.
2.5 Maintenance
The design of the protective relay system should facilitate
periodic testing and maintenance. Test devices or switches
should be used to eliminate the necessity to remove or
disconnect wires during testing.
Equipment should be located physically so as to be easily
accessible.
2.6 Coordination of System Planning and Relay Protection
Close cooperation should be maintained between the respective
System Planning, Operating, and Protection groups to insure
that modifications or additions to the power system or its
relaying will result in facilities that can be adequately
protected and reliably and safely operated.
3.0 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ALL APPLICATIONS
3.1 Instrument Transformers and Potential Devices
3.11 Current Transformers - Each current transformer
associated with relaying must have adequate
characteristics for its intended function. In
particular, the following requirements apply:
3.111 The long-time thermal capability on
the highest ratio tap should be at
least equal to the long-time thermal
capability of the equipment with
which the current transformer is
associated.
3.112 The output of each current trans
former must remain within acceptable
limits under all anticipated fault
currents and connected burdens to
insure correct operation of the
protective relay system.
3.113 The short-time thermal and mechanical
capabilities on the operating tap must
be adequate to prevent damage under
maximum fault conditions or emergency
system loading conditions.
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3.23 Each battery should have sufficient capacity to
permit operation of the station in the event of
loss of its battery charger or battery charger
supply source for the period of time necessary
to switch the load to the other battery or
re-establish the supply source.. Each charger
should be of sufficient capacity to supply the
total DC load of the station.
A switching arrangement should be provided to
connect the total load to either battery without
creating areas where, prior to failure of either
a battery or a charger, a single contingency can
disable both DC supplies.
3.2U Batteries and chargers and all associated circuits
must be protected against short circuits, and all
protective devices should be coordinated to.
minimize the effect of any disturbance.
3.25 The circuitry between the battery and its first
protecting device should possess the highest
possible degree of reliability.
3.26 The regulation of the DC voltage should be such
that voltage within acceptable limits will be
supplied to all devices under all DC loading
conditions.
3.27 Abnormal DC voltage levels, both high and low,
should be monitored to detect cha.rger and
battery troubles. Other abnormal conditions,
such as loss of AC to battery chargers, charger
failure, and DC system grounds should also be
monitored.
3.28 Careful attention should be given to the design
of the DC system to minimize voltage transients.
3-3 Circuit Breakers
The application of circuit breakers should conform to
appropriate standards as published by the American National
Standards Institute.
Circuit breaker auxiliary switches used in protective relay
circuits should be of a highly reliable type with a positive
make-break action and good contact wipe.
Two trip coils must be provided for each operating mechanism
and so arranged that failure of one coil will not damage or
impair the operation of the other coil.
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3.h Control Wiring
Control wiring and all 'auxiliary control devices should
be of such quality as to assure high reliability with due
consideration given for published codes and standards,
fire hazards, current-carrying capacity, voltage drop,
insulation level, mechanical strength, shielding, grounding
and environment.
3.5 Physical Separation
Physical separation should be maintained between any two
relaying systems which protect the same area in order to
minimize the risk of both sets being simultaneously disabled
by fire or accidents.
3.6 Communication Channels
Where communication channels are required to obtain
adequate relaying, the communication facilities should
be of such overall quality as to reflect the same degree
of reliability as the relay system.
Where redundant communication channels are required, these
channels should be separated physically and designed to
minimise the risk of simultaneous failures by avoiding
mutual-use components.
3.7 Environment
Means should be employed tc maintain environmental conditions
that are favorable to the "continued correct performance of
protective relays.
k.O TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTION
Each of the two independent relay systems must recognize and
initiate action to clear any line fault without undue system
disturbance. One of the relay systems should operate fast enough
for any line fault so that if ultimate clearing must be accom
plished by a breaker failure scheme, a widespread system
disturbance will not result. A protective system, which can
operate for faults beyond the area it is designed to protect,
should be selective in time with breaker failure clearing of
the area it is overreaching, except in those cases where lack
of selectivity can be tolerated.
Relay systems associated with transmission facilities must be
designed not to operate due to system swings which are less
severe than those v/hich would result in instability. Where
stability is not a consideration, the relay system should not
limit the load-carrying ability of a line except in unusual
cases , and under such circumstances, the conditions must be
well documented.
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3.1l' In each independent relaying system,
separate current transformer secondary
windings must be used.
3.115 The current transformer or its secondary
windings must be located so that
adjacent relay protective zones overlap.
3.116 Current transformer secondary systems
(paralleled current transformers,
differential systems, etc.) must be
grounded at only a single point.
3.117 Care should be taken in specifying the
size and type of current transformer
secondary leads to assist in keeping
the current transformer burden within
design limits and to provide mechanical
strength.
3.12 Potential Transformers and Potential Devices
3.121 Potential transformers and potential
devices must have adequate characteristics
and volt-ampere capacity to supply the
connected burden and maintain their
required accuracy over the specified
primary voltage range.
3.122 Two relay systems protecting the same
area must not rely on a common source
of potential. The two systems may use
separate secondary windings on one
transformer or device, provided each
secondary winding has sufficient capacity
to permit fuse protection of the circuit.
3.123 Where fuse ratings of less than 20 amperes
are used, special attention should be
given to the physical properties of the
fuse.
3.12!+ Potential transformer secondaries should
be grounded at only one point.
3.2 Batteries and Direct Current (DC) Supply
3.21 It is essential that the DC supply associated with the
power system protection have an extremely high degree
of reliability.
3.22 Two batteries each with its own charger must be
provided at each location. The two relaying
systems protecting the same area must be supplied
from separate batteries.
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Where relaying systems require commun icat, ion facilities in
order to perform their protective function, the protective
systems must be so designed that a loss or misoperation of
any one communication facility will not allow incorrect
tripping of more than one line for an external fault. The
design must also be such that if two relay systems protecting
the same line use communication facilities, the loss of any
one communication facility or power supply will not impair the
operation of both relay systems .
5.0 TRANSMISSION STATION PROTECTION
Each area in a station must be protected by two independent relay
systems. In areas not protected by line relaying, at least one
of the two systems should be a differential type.
One of the relay systems should operate fast enough for any
station fault so that if ultimate clearing is accomplished by
a breaker failure system, a widespread disturbance will not
result. The relay systems should operate properly for the
anticipated range of currents and, if practical, to the momentary
rating for which the buses are constructed.
All relay systems must be designed so they will not operate for
load current or system swings which are less severe than those
which would result in instability.
Due consideration should be given to the station ground grids,
control cables, etc., to minimize the risk of false operation
of protective relay systems which might result from fault current
and/or transient voltages in the station.
5.1 Breaker Failure Protection
Breaker backup relay systems must be installed to trip
local and remote breakers as required to protect the
system if any breaker fails to interrupt. One set of
relays protecting each individual area must also
initiate the breaker failure protection. Fault current
detectors must be used to determine if a breaker has
failed to interrupt. In addition, auxiliary switches
may be necessary for high-speed detection of a failed
breaker where the distribution of fault current may
be such that fault detectors operate sequentially -
Examples of this can be found with breaker-and-one-half
and ring-bus arrangements. Auxiliary switches may also
be required, in instances where the fault currents are
not large enough to operate the fault detectors.
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6.0 GENERATOR PROTECTION
Generator faults severe enough to disturb the bulk power system
must be detected by more than one protective relay system.
In addition, generators should be protected to keep damage to the
equipment and outage time to a minimum.
In view of the special consideration of generator unit protection,
the following items are listed as electrical conditions which
should be detected by the protective relays:
1. Field ground
2. Loss of excitation
3. Faults in the generator or generator leads
k. Generator out of step with the rest of the system
5. Faults in the unit transformer
6. Unbalanced phase currents
7. Faults in unit-connected station service transformer
8. Over-excitation
It is recognized that the overall protection of a generator must
also involve non-electrical considerations. These have not been
included as a part of this philosophy.
The apparatus should be protected when the generator is starting
up or shutting down as well as running at normal speed; this may
require additional relays as the normal relays may not function
satisfactorily at low frequencies.
A generator should not be tripped for a system swing condition
except when that particular generator is out of step with the
remainder of the system. This does not apply to relay systems
designed to trip the generator as part of an overall plan to
maintain stability of the power system.
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